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Abstract—Digital Healthcare systems are very popular lately,
as they provide a variety of helpful means to monitor people’s
health state as well as to protect people against an unexpected
health situation. These systems contain a huge amount of personal
information in a form of electronic health records that are not
allowed to be disclosed to unauthorised users. Hence, health data
and information need to be protected against attacks and thefts.
In this paper, we propose a secure distributed architecture for
healthcare data storage and analysis. It uses a novel security
model to rigorously control permissions of accessing sensitive
data in the system, as well as to protect the transmitted data
between distributed system servers and nodes. The model also
satisfies the NIST security requirements. Thorough experimental
results show that the model is very promising.
Index Terms—Healthcare system, Electronic Health Record
(EHR), Kerberos, LDAP, Symmetric Key Scheme, Public Key
Scheme, Hash Function, SSL/TLS.
I. INTRODUCTION
E-Healthcare systems are very popular in recent years, as it
becomes a matter of urgency to manage and control patients’
data. This data can be used to support them in bad health and
emergency situations, to evaluate practitioner performance,
or to operate as a health-caring consultant1 as well. Hence,
users find the most of healthcare applications and devices
helpful. In order to predict and support patients well-being,
their data should be collected and stored in a form of electronic
health records (EHR). However, as patients’ data is very
sensitive and must be protected against leakage and attacks, the
patients do not trust e-healthcare systems. For instance, Orange
telecommunication provider declared that 78% of users did not
trust companies in the way their data was used.2. Therefore,
users’ trust has been raised, as their personal data must be
protected and processed in a secret way against possibilities
of being unexpectedly disclosed. Moreover, increasing user’s
trust will surely guarantee the sustainability of the potential
data-driven economy.
To protect patients’ data against any abusive use or attacks,
several international regulations [8] have been issued, such as
the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), the Health Information Technology for Economic
1How Health Care Analytics Improves Patient Care, https://health-
informatics.uic.edu/blog/how-health-care-analytics-improves-patient-care/
2Rethinking Personal Data: Trust and Context in User-Centred Data
Ecosystems, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF RethinkingPersonal-
Data TrustandContext Report 2014.pdf
and Clinical Health (HITECH), the European Union’s Data
Protection Directive, the Australian Privacy Act and Japan’s
Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA). These regulations
set policies on data access to the health information in the
majority regions of the world. However, they do not protect
personal data directly against all vulnerabilities. Therefore, the
risks of leaking patient’s personal information still exist.
Marci et al. in [19] analysed the potential issues of security
and privacy that can affect healthcare systems, such as access
to data, how and when data is stored, security of data transfer,
data analysis rights, and the governing policies. Among them,
[18] [1] [15] protected the data during the storage and access
processes, while [4] [20] [14] proposed secure solutions for
data when it is transmitted through the network.
In [22], a large-scale healthcare system was built to collect
and analyse the health information about obesity in children.
The data is collected from patients and voluntary students
in different schools, cities, countries and regions in Europe.
Besides the data analytics, the question is how to protect this
big data against unauthorised users. The proposed security
protocol is similar to [22], but with more efficient policies
and mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a distributed
architecture to manage healthcare data more autonomously and
process data queries more rigorously and with high security.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section
II presents the related works along with their drawbacks and
trade-offs. Sections III and IV describe the adopted healthcare
system and its architecture, respectively. Section V describes
user authentication and authorisation mechanisms. Section VI
presents controller authentication and its authorisation meth-
ods. The secure data transmission is presented in Section VII.
Section VIII discusses the evaluation of the proposed model
against the security attacks. Experimental results are reported
in Section IX. We conclude in Section X.
II. RELATED WORK
Health care systems have been under development for quite
a while. Their main goal is to reduce the administrative
cost, operational time, and to improve the work efficiency in
medical related works. In order to retrieve patients’ data more
effectively and to provide richer data sets for health measure-
ments, authors in [26] proposed a database using mobile health
monitors. They can collect a huge amount of data for further
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2processes in predicting probabilities of chronic diseases, for
instance. Whereas, authors in [30] built a healthcare system
with data analytics capabilities for diagnosing diseases early
from symptoms provided by patients. The authors exploited
the data mining technique, namely Naive Bayes, to detect
diseases from given symptoms. These works did not focus
on the privacy and security issues.
Privacy and security issues in the healthcare information
management systems have been emphasised for years. To
address privacy risks in sharing healthcare information, [24]
outlined how sensitive this data is and any disclosure of
such data may have devastating consequences on patients.
Furthermore, Kotz et al. [17] discussed several issues from
policy, regulation to technologies, such as anonymity, hash,
homomorphic cryptography, and differential privacy. How-
ever, the point is that these technologies cannot guarantee a
complete privacy. There is still a need for a security-aware
model that combines several security and privacy technologies
to ensure data confidentiality and user privacy in healthcare
systems.
Some works had different approaches in designing the
security-aware system framework in protecting user privacy
or detecting the system risks to get back to defend users.
As in [9], the authors proposed a privacy-aware framework
for managing and sharing electronic medical record data for
the cancer patient care based on block chain technology. [11]
proposed a secure framework for a distributed network based
on grid technique and encryption techniques in controlling data
access through a set of policies. Another work [2] presented a
security-aware model to forensically visualise the evidence and
attack scenario in a computer system from network log files
so that the system operation can avoid such attacks. Authors
in [12] proposed an interesting security-aware framework to
protect the system from the internal attackers. In this work,
authors protect the system resources by creating walls, each
of which owns different security properties, between users and
the system resources to make users unable to recognise those
resources. Another work by Liu et al. [18] built up the access
control applied Role-based Access Control (RBAC) to protect
the user privacy in EHRs stored in the database from any
outside access. This work can protect the data from external
accesses, however, the secure data transmission has not been
dealt with.
For cryptographic solutions, the authors in [25] discussed
possible solutions for security and privacy issues of big data
heathcare systems. They studied a solution based on de-
identification, using data-centric approach that allows data
to be decrypted, untokened or unmasked by only authorised
objects or access control. Hence, a more detailed solution is
needed for a distributed system and protect it from all risks
of disclosing the patients’ information. Authors in [3] adopted
the de-identification and proper ID management techniques
to hide important information in the database. Whereas, in
[22], the authors focused on the privacy preservation by
applying de-identification and anonymity techniques to prevent
the health information to be disclosed from the data storage.
Another approach in applying the encryption technique was
proposed by Miao et al. [21]. They designed a secure model for
searching the health information from the encrypted database
by applying encryption algorithm. In addition, some other
works as [5] [6] [7] applied the homomorphic encryption
and secure comparison algorithms to make the collaboration
among parties in the system unable to violate the data of the
other sides. Some other research works focus on leveraging
distributed ledger technology in protecting the health informa-
tion. In [10], the authors preserved the privacy of medical data
stored and transmitted among Internet of Things (IoT) devices
by adopting block chain approach and symmetric lightweight
cryptographic algorithm in the distributed network. In [31]
[28], the authors focused on securing data transmission by
applying TLS/SSL solutions and encryption algorithms such
as AES and RSA, but the data storage security has not been
dealt with in their solutions.
From another approach view, in this paper, we propose a
solution for preserving user privacy and data security in both
data transmission and storage for an effective dealt with the
big health data. More specifically, we propose a distributed
model for executing methods of protecting data against attacks
such as replay attack, eavesdropping attack, and unauthorised
spy. In order to set such objectives, we exploit the current
powerful techniques, such as Kerberos, LDAP, Active Direc-
tory, SSL/TLS, etc., combined with different cryptographic
algorithms AES CBC/GCM, RSA, DES, SHA-2, ECDSA, etc.
III. DATA ACCESS SECURITY SETTINGS
In the following we define the end-user role categorisation
in detail, their respective permissions to data access, and other
system components’ permissions.
A. User Role Categorisation
In our system, we define different classes of users depending
on their roles, and grant different permissions for each class
role. Each user has a pair of username, password, and roles
in the system. A user can have more than one role in the
system. Figure 1 shows the relationship among user roles in
the system. More specifically, there are three classes of users:
school, clinic, and admin. For each class, different access
rights were defined to reflect their activities and interactions
with the system. The admin user manages users and classes.
The roles are defined in the following:
• Each class school has a school admin for managing the
school users, who may have different roles. The school
user roles are teacher, and students. In the school, there
are many groups of students. A group is managed by a
teacher.
• Each class clinic has a clinic admin for managing clinic
users. The clinic roles are clinician and patients. A
clinician manages a number of patients in the clinic.
• The admin class includes the core system administrators,
admin outside schools and clinic admin staff. In this
class, a system admin, called global admin, manages all
the users of the whole system, a policy maker identifies
conditions associated to childhood obesity and designs
effective policies, which are then applied to hospitals,
schools, communities, etc.
3Fig. 1. EHS User Categorisation.
Moreover, the storage system has two major databases,
which are MongoDB3 and Cassandra4. The Cassandra
database stores the time-series data collected from users’
wearable devices, such as smart watch and smart sensors,
and smart phone, whereas, the MongoDB database stores the
most sensitive data of the system. These include user man-
agement and other private data. In this work, we apply Role-
based Access Control (RBAC) technique to efficiently manage
system’s users based on their roles. The admin information
are stored in MongoDB. These include the user’s registration
information and other information required by the system,
such as username, password, roles and global ID number, etc.
Depending on the roles, a user may have other administrative
details such as sub-role, group ID, school ID, clinic ID, and
supervisor ID. All collected and derived data of a participant,
that was stored in either MongoDB or Cassandra is identified
with a global ID. In other words, a unique global ID is assigned
to each participant in the system to reference any piece of their
data in the BigO system. Users are granted access permissions
to the system based on their role. For example, the clinician
can access the data of their patients only via clinic portal, the
teacher can access data of their students only via school portal.
More details of the user verification process are presented in
Section V.
B. Permission Settings
The system consists of two types of components: controllers
and modules. A controller includes a set of services provided
to end-users or to the other modules. Each controller has lim-
ited privileges for providing access to the back-end. Therefore,
all access permissions requested by the controllers are checked
based on a technique called Discretionary Access Control
(DAC). Each controller is evaluated for its own permissions for
each collection, and it may have the permissions to read (R)
a data, write (W) a data or both read and write (RW). With a
reading permission, for instance, a controller can make select
or find request to the database (select query for MongoDB and
find query for Cassandra). For writing, a controller can send
an insert/update/remove or modify request to any if the two
databases.
In the DAC Table (see Figure 2), a number of controllers
are provided with the reading and writing permissions with
the respective data, that is, collections/tables in the databases.
3https: //www.mongodb.com/
4http://cassandra.apache.org
The columns in DAC table are the system controllers, and
the rows represent collections/tables. For instance, the portal
controller has RW permissions on all the collections. A
detailed description of the controller verification process is
presented in Section VI-B.
MongoDB privilege actions Cassandra permissions
R find select
W insert, update, remove modify
…
…
Fig. 2. DAC Table of Controllers vs Collections
IV. SECURITY-AWARE ARCHITECTURE
We adopted the MongoDB and Cassandra database man-
agement systems to leverage the power of each of them,
especially, a combination of the both can exploit fully their
strong characteristics. Specifically, Cassandra manages only
user data crawled from the smart mobile devices, and its very
fast writing queries. Whereas, MongoDB manages the rest
of user information (e.g., users, clinics, schools, timelines,
regions, statistics, etc.), and it supports a good querying per-
formance for its feature index settings. Moreover, MongoDB
supports authentication and authorisation using Kerberos [16]
and LDAP [27], as well as AES encryption5 at-rest and
in-flight modes. Cassandra supports authentication and au-
thorisation using LDAP, data transmission using Transparent
Data Encryption (TDE)6. The security techniques supported
by MongoDB and Cassandra fulfil the security requirements
against current attacks.7
We adopted a security design architecture at every layer and
between layers (see Figure 3). The layers are controller layer,
access control layer and back-end layer. Each layer verifies
the permissions of the lower layer. Therefore, it is more strict
to check the data access from the bottom layer to top layer.
Within each layer one needs to deal with the security of the
following types of data original data, de-identified statistics
data, and anonymised data. The security level increases from
original to anonymised data, as the data gets de-identified,
anonymised and perturbed respectively.
Consider the controller layer, a controller contains a set
of services providing the end-users access from the external
network or from another component from the system. The
5Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), NIST, FIPS 197,
2001
6Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption Best Prac-
tices, https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/security/twp-transparent-
data-encryption-bes-130696.pdf
7Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication, NIST, FIPS 142, 2001
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Fig. 3. Security-aware 3× 3 matrix model
Mobile App Controller provides a set of interfaces for mobile
users to access services such as inputting user’s information
about meals, activities, etc. These mobile data values are
saved in the mobile device memory before their transfer to
Cassandra. The Portal controller supports a set of interfaces
that can be used to access the supported web services, such
as Clinical Analysis Services for measuring the activity rates,
predicting the effect of users’ activities, etc. This data is
transmitted to MongoDB or the related Analysis Services.
Any controller access that is requested by the end-users are
evaluated using RBAC as mentioned in Section III-A. The two
other controllers; Web Portal and Analysis Services access the
data through a Secured View.
For the access control layer, there are two investigations
for evaluating its requests, that is, DAC and Secured View.
These parts are executed by the authentication server. Only
Mobile App Controller and Portal Controller can access DAC,
while only Analysis Backend and Analysis Services can access
Secured View. DAC determines weather the requesting con-
troller is eligible to access the data in the back-end layer before
performing its request. The Secured View controls and restricts
access to the data by encouraging the controllers to use de-
identified and anonymised data in order to protect data from
possible vulnerabilities of leaking the personal information.
At the back-end layer, the database server protects data one
more time against the unauthorised controllers and end-users
by determining weather that controller and user can access
such requested data. The Original Data is raw data and it is
readable. The Identified Statistics Data contains data excluding
the identity information of the users. The Anonymised Data
stores data without leaving any trace of an inference to the
user identity.
Furthermore, components of 3 × 3 matrix are located
in a physically distributed servers. In particular, databases
are stored in different servers, i.e., original MongoDB data,
original Cassandra data, and reference data of original data
column are stored on the three separate servers. The individual
aggregated data and population statistics data are stored on
one server, and the de-identified data for analysis is stored on
another server. The distributed database storage plays a key
role in improving data management and privacy against the
linkability attack.
Controller
/Module
Security 
check
Data request
Data request
Fig. 4. Double security check at each component and module.
Moreover, each component shown in Figure 3 is indepen-
dent. Therefore, the process of receiving a request from a com-
ponent and transferring the result to the next component can
cause a privilege violation, if the security between components
is not enforced. Hence, the data flow between components
should be rigorously verified on its path at each component
hop. Each component identifies the client and evaluates its
permissions before processing the received request. Then it
transfers the result to the next component. The next component
again evaluates the client’s permissions (c.f. Figure 4) and so
on until the last hop is reached. For example, in Figure 3
only mobile app and portal controllers can access directly to
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) component of the access
control layer, to query the original and statistical datasets,
and only Web Applications Controller and Analysis Services
can access Secured Views of the access control layer. The
RBAC component stores mappings of which controller/user
can access which database, while the secured views store
anonymised data that remove the Quasi-identifiable (QI) data
[29].
V. END-USER PRIVILEGE CHECK
A request transaction can be described a security-aware 3×3
matrix model. Basically, the controller layer implements a set
of REST APIs to support user queries to database. An end-
user who wants to access a database needs to log into a given
controller. This is the first shield of the model in protecting
the database. Each end-user u has their own credential (i.e.,
user name unu and password pu). The user can have one or
more roles, denoted as lroleu, in the system (e.g., a teacher, a
clinician, a school administrator, a clinic administrator, etc.), a
unique ID IDu and their organisation ID orgIDu (e.g., school
ID, clinic ID, etc.). To authenticate and authorise a user, the
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) technique [13] is used to
handle the data access permission of controllers. The role of a
user or their organisation is checked for any data access. The
details are given in the following.
A. Token-based User Authentication
User authentication happens when a user sends a log-in
service request to the controller, a long with their credential
as an input. The user credentials are formally formulated as
follows.
5Definition 1 (User Credential). Let u be a user of the system.
Let (unu, pu) be a pair of user name and password. Let
IDu, lroleu, orgu be u’s ID, role list, and organisation ID,
respectively. The user credential Cru can be defined as:
Cru = [IDu, (unu, pu), lroleu, orgIDu]
All passwords are hashed before being stored in the
database. Based on this credential, the controller authenticates
the user in collaboration with a security server. To provide
the user a legal authentication certification to use for their
subsequent requests, the controller gets a JASON Web Token
(JWT) generated by the security server. This JWT is created
using the RSA algorithm with 512-bit key size. The JWT is
expired after a 120 minutes. Therefore, the user has to send a
request to the server to get a new JWT. With the new JWT, the
process can continue. More formally, the JWT is formulated
as follows.
Lemma 1 (JWT Token). Let u, Cru be a user and their
credential. JWT(Cru,t) is JWT token at time t for the user u
with credential Cru. It is defined as follows:
JWTCru =[RSA512(Header(Cru,t))|
RSA512(Payload(Cru,t))|
RSA512(Sign(Cru,t))]
with Header(Cru,t) = {algjwt|typejwt}
Payload(Cru,t) = {lroleu|issu|IDu|
exp time(u,t)|versionu,t|iatu}
(1)
where
• ′|′ is a concatenation operator.
• Header(u,t) contains algorithm algjwt (e.g., RSA512)
and token type typejwt.
• Payload(u,t) is the token body involving a user u’s
role list lroleu, the issuer issu grants this token for u,
an identity IDu of u, an expiration time exp time(u,t)
computed since time t to use the services, version of
token, and the issuing time of token.
• Sign(u,t) is the signature of the header, payload and
secret key using SHA-512.
Example 1. An example of JWT token, generated from user
u’s credential, is given in Figures 5. Figure 5a presents a
code of an encoded JWT, and Figure 5b shows a structure of
post-decoded JWT.
Lemma 2 (Unique User Token). Let t denote the time and u
the user with credential Cru. The token JWT(Cru,t) is unique
for user u within a period of time t + ∆.
Proof. JWT token is based on the current date time t of the
server. The time t is unique and it is obtained automatically
from the server. The user name and their credential are unique.
Only one hash value using SHA512 appended into the JWT
token as the hashed content is unique with the unique secret
key and the unique issuing time. Therefore, there is only one
JWTCru to be generated according to one Cru.
The Lemma 2 guarantees that a legal user can always access
the controller’s services in an interval of time ∆. As the same
{
"typ": "JWT",
"alg": "RS512"
}
{
"roles": [
"child"
],
"iss": "BigOAuth",
"_id": "5a94245eec00a601d2824a90",
"exp": 1519743605,
"version": "3.3",
"iat": 1519736405
}
HMACSHA256(
base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
base64UrlEncode(payload), [secret]
)
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzUxMiJ9.eyJyb2xlcyI6
WyJjaGlsZCJdLCJpc3MiOiJCaWdPQXV0aCIsIl9pZCI6IjVhO
TQyNDVlZWMwMGE2MDFkMjgyNGE5MCIsImV4cCI6MTUxOTc0Mz
YwNSwidmVyc2lvbiI6IjMuMyIsImlhdCI6MTUxOTczNjQwNX0
.UJzkEF6fVfJxbrFUzb6udNeaaJ0Bp3pTpGaYfSnvsuF1Gas5
G-
O8rA_zNu8XdtzhpWAx0NwHwIu3royRmX2svitrV4r7fj9zoZA
xkNDcFPOmPhTEvR06YRrJFGrXha_YnGwpXTn0mHrWF_PyL2u0
iCs1aGBH28NKyCJNVeGIFRffIgQadxIXLmUBducY06I7mF0nv
8MvkBpWSEFXcQbdYH8oCl0ExyZ6a58Z2KdHDSngEud1imgQNN
nmDBAnb6ShINjowDYPK-HLX9ZQK7Y0bPpzl-
wDACzbWzne5B3HpK0rQCAJnyKfic7XG-
foVr6BIe4PJdoWjpgRPCxsj5th-
W0kjjHkiagsLKpb87gkN8Ba9lmOo0CdYsbADgJHf1SWcyaQhC
BHrsXFA4VPou_keCt5M1RGNJ32ZM596J8GdAam2z77rIas6dK
RMHfmLD7V9X8p2V66bGD7iEjXbZA4ivWDxBpFCTjeV2Uk8J7o
lEqtzXSqc_93ldpBCWmzaEUzWSAhz9MRAxRZivZcdT-
mspDq2Z4WV-Tvz0Q-_y_6A63lQWcwmYMuApJgtNjIs-
sANREKB8WlCX-
VQc9hsyOMWGbqImoUrG71zbFbpcwRY5jgAneSJ8rLUsXKhBat
cfmt18hmLvQq3t5nkQgzC7Vvn4Oudw3Mvebu6GsPgSDF2kc
a) Encoded JWT b) Decoded JWT
Fig. 5. An example of an encoded and decoded JWT
user credential and a requested time, the generated token is
unique, hence, the controller can recognise the user identity
through their token uniquely.
After successful authentication, the end-user u can access
the REST APIs of a given controller using their JWT(Cru,t).
Whenever a user u requests a service, JWT(Cru,t) is em-
bedded into that request. The called REST API checks if
JWT(Cru,t) is valid, and the user’s roles in the JWT(Cru,t)
cover the permission of using the called request.
B. Collection-based User Authorisation
Database stores user information using a specific data struc-
ture, called collection. A collection is a list of documents and
each document keeps the information of one user. This storage
method does not check if all documents have a uniform format.
To authorise a user, the controller needs to seek their relevant
information in a collection called ”USER” of the database
where all users’ information are saved. Then, it checks the
user’s permission on the requested data by checking their
credential and their administrative information. Specifically,
a user permission is well authenticated if it satisfies two
conditions, that is, (C1) only the administrative staff can access
the information of users they manage (see Definition 2), and
(C2) a staff member can only read or write the information of
a user in their organisation (see Definition 3).
Definition 2 (Legal stewardship). Let u and v be the data
user and owner, respectively. Let lroleu be the role list of u.
Let orgIDv be the organisation ID of v. A Legal Stewardship
is established between u and v iff:
∃i|((roleu[i] ∈ lroleu) ∧ (roleu[i] ∈ admin(orgIDv)))
where admin() is the function returning a list of the admin-
istrative roles of v’s organisation.
Definition 3 (Solid membership). Let u, v be the data user
and owner, respectively. Let orgIDu, orgIDv be the IDs of
the organisations of u and v, respectively. A Solid Membership
between u and v exists iff:
orgIDu = orgIDv
6Lemma 3 (User Authorisation). User u can access the data
of a patient v if and only if user u’s permission satisfies
the two conditions (C1) and (C2) as in Definitions 2 and 3,
respectively.
Example 2. Let consider the case where the user is a clinician
A of Clinic X . A makes a query on the user B’s information
from the database. Moreover, B is a patient of Clinic X .
Therefore, C1 and C2 are satisfied. Then, clinician A is
allowed to query on B’s information from the database.
The authorisation procedure is described in Algorithm 1,
namely authorizeUserPermission(), to check the user u’s per-
mission on some data of v which u aims to access. Basically,
as mentioned in Definitions 2, 3, the u’s information, involving
u’s role list lroleu and u’s organisation ID orgIDu, are
achieved from their credential (cf. Definition 1). To satisfy
both lemmas above, v’s role and organisation ID need to
be obtained. v’s information are queried from the relevant
collections through v’s ID.
Algorithm 1 authorizeUserPermission()
Input: lroleu, orgIDu, IDv
Output: ′true′|′false′
1: orgIDv = findOrginCol(”USER”, IDv);
2: lroleAdminOfOrgv = findAdminOfV Org(OrgIDv);
3: isRightRole = false;
4: isSameOrg = false;
5: for (∀rolei ∈ lroleu, i = 0...n) do
6: for (∀rolej ∈ lroleAdminOfOrgv , j = 0...m) do
7: if (rolei == rolej) then
8: isRightRole = true;
9: break;
10: end if
11: end for
12: if (isRightRole == true) then
13: break;
14: else
15: return false;
16: end if
17: end for
18: if (orgIDu! = orgIDv) then
19: isSameOrg = false;
20: return false;
21: end if
22: return true;
Specifically, the Algorithm 1 inputs are the list of roles
of the user u, their organisation ID, and v’s ID. The algo-
rithm outputs a boolean value ”True” if the authorisation
is successful, and returns a boolean value ”False” if the
authorisation failed. Initially, the necessary information of
v are retrieved, such as their organisation ID orgIDv (cf.
line 1) based on which the list of administrative roles in v’s
organisation lroleAdminOfOrgv are obtained (cf. line 2).
Moreover, to check the two aforementioned conditions C1 and
C2, we initialise the two Boolean variables, i.e., isRightRole
and isSameOrg. isRightRole contains the result of C1 eval-
uation, and isSameOrg contains the result of C2 evaluation.
Initially, both are set to ”False” (cf. lines 3, 4). Then, u’s
role list lroleu is examined (cf. line 5). The administrative
roles in v’s organisation lroleAdminOfOrgv are investigated
simultaneously (cf. line 6). Each element rolei in lroleu
is compared to each element rolej in lroleAdminOfOrgv .
If there is a case of two matched elements (cf. line 7),
isRightRole is set to ”True” (cf. line 8), and the two loops
are stopped (cf. lines 9, 12, 13). Otherwise, the algorithm
stops and return ”False” (cf. line 15). In the case of C1 is
successful, function authorizeUser() continues to check C2
through the two organisation IDs of u and v (i.e., orgIDu
and orgIDv) (cf. line 18). If both are different, the vari-
able isSameOrg is set to ”False” (cf. line 19), function
authorizeUserPermission is stopped and returns ”False”
(cf. line 20). In the case of the two conditions C1 and
C2 are satisfied, the authorisation is successful, and function
authorizeUserPermission() returns ”True”.
VI. CONTROLLER AUTHORITY EVALUATION
The second part of the model protecting the database is
the access control layer (cf. Figure 3) which manages the
data influence by controllers. In the proposed architecture,
databases in the back-end layer are not accessible by all
controllers. Each database is restricted for a number of specific
controllers. The controller that receives user request and makes
a connection to a certain database to get the data is called
requesting controller. The database that contains the requested
data is called requested database. There is an authentication
and authorisation process between the requested database and
the requesting controller whenever they handshake for a data
request/response transaction. In our work, Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) technique [13] is deployed to handle the data
access permission of controllers. RBAC is executed based on
leveraging the controller’s identity.
A. Single-Sign-On Controller Authentication
To identify the requesting controller, the access control
layer verifies the controller’s credential. Each controller is set
with a controller name and a password by the developer. Its
name must be unique in the system. Moreover, the controller
has a secret key denoted as Kc, generated from controller’s
password by using some certain hash function.
Definition 4 (Controller Credential). Let c, cnc, pc be the ver-
ified controller, controller’s name, and password, respectively.
Let IDc and Kc be the controller’s identity and public key,
respectively. Formally, the credential of a controller is defined
as:
Crc = [(cnc, pc), IDc,Kc]
In order to monitor several users accessing system services,
a Kerberos Center (KC) is used for controlling authentica-
tion (cf. Figure 6). Kerberos is an authentication protocol
between unknown parties in a secure manner. KC involves
two servers, that is, Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket
Granting Service (TGS). In our work, this authentication
protocol is operated between system controller and KC. The
authentication is based on a ticket generated by AS. Basically,
the ticket is generated using time constraint that limits the
ticket’s time-to-live (TTL), and the controller name is saved in
the controller credential. This authentication ticket guarantees
the “Single Sign On (SSO)” property of the log-in system.
It indicates that the controller needs to do authentication with
7KC and then it uses this ticket for subsequent communications
between the controller and the data.
Definition 5 (Service Ticket). Let IDc, TSc be controller
c’s ID and a time stamp of the ticket, respectively. Let PKs,
SKs be secret key and session key of service s, respectively.
The service ticket of c, denoted Tc, can be generated, by an
encryption algorithm:
TKc = EncPKs(IDc, TSc, SKs)
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Fig. 6. Keberos-based Controller Authentication
Each ticket has a time stamp that protects it against the
replay attack. Once the time stamp is reached, a new ticket
is generated with a new time stamp. Therefore, the adversary
cannot reuse the ticket for another transaction. Moreover, each
ticket has a session key used for transactions between the
service and the controller. Tickets generated for the same con-
troller are obviously different from other controllers’ tickets.
In addition, the encryption of the ticket is made with the secret
key of the service, hence, it can be decrypted by only the same
service.
Lemma 4 (Unique Ticket). Let c, TKc be the verified con-
troller and ticket that TGS generates for c (cf. Lemma 5). TKc
is unique.
Proof. Given a controller c and a service s c wants to access
the data service s. A ticket is generated for c; TKc. TKc is
unique. Because, from Lemma 5, a ticket is an encryption of
c’s identity IDc, a s’s shared key SKs, and a time stamp TSc,
where
• The controller identity IDc is unique.
• The secret key of service s, called SKs, is unique in the
system.
• The encryption made from the two above elements with
the secret key of s cannot be duplicated in the system.
Therefore, tickets of controllers are unique.
Furthermore, Kerberos operates in cooperation with LDAP
server. All controller’s information and their permissions are
stored in the active directory of the LDAP server. For each
entry in the active directory, it contains username, password,
organisation, group, domain name (i.e., a link attached to the
organisation), access permissions, etc.8
The authentication protocol is depicted in Figure 6. The
details of the protocol are given in Table I. To start an
authentication, a controller c connects to KC and sends its
ID (IDc) to AS (step 1). Then, AS uses IDc to lookup c in
its master database (step 2.1). If c is not in the database, the
connection is rejected. Otherwise, AS continues to process the
authentication request. AS creates a time stamp for c (TSc)
(step 2.2). TSc is used for checking if the ticket is still valid,
otherwise, TSc needs to be renewed. AS then generates a
ticket, Tc, for c that is an encryption of c’s identity (i.e., IDc),
a time stamp, (TSc), and a session key of TGS (SKTGS )
(step 2.3). SKTGS is used by c and TGS in subsequent steps.
The ticket Tc is used for authenticating c with TGS before
getting the permission to access database. Then, AS retrieves
the password of c, that is Crc.pc (step 2.4) to re-generate the
secret key of c (Kc) (step 2.5). AS creates two messages; MA
and MB , to be sent back to c (step 2.6). MB = Tc and MA
is the encryption of the session key of TGS (SKTGS ). So,
MA = EncKc(SKTGS ). AS sends MA,MB to c (step 3). c
generates the secret key Kc from its password Crc.pc (step
4.1). c uses Kc to decrypt MA and obtain SKTGS (step 4.2).
If c fails to process the decryption, it indicates that c cannot
access the system as their password is invalid. If c successfully
decrypts the message, it creates two messages; MC and MD
(step 4.3). c sends MC and MD to TGS (step 5). MC involves
MB , the identity of the requested service (IDDBS) and the
requested command is executed ReqDBS (reading ′R′, writing
′W ′, searching ′S′ and/or comparing ′C ′), whereas, MD is an
encryption of c’s identity (IDc) and the current time stamp of
c (TSc). TGS decrypts MB to MC by its secret key PKTGS
(step 6.1) to get the shared key SKTGS and the identity of
c (IDc). TGS decrypts MD with the retrieved key SKTGS
to get the identity of c (IDc) (step 6.2). TGS compares the
two identities of c obtained in steps 6.1 and 6.2. If they are
equal, c is authenticated to TGS. The controller authorisation
is described in Section VI-A.
B. Controller Authorisation
Two kinds of permissions were investigated: Read and
Write. Write permission indicates the act of inserting a new
data into the database. Write (W) permission cannot delete or
change data that is already stored in the database. Read (R)
permission is the ability to retrieve data from the database
without making any changes to the data.
Example 3. Mobile App controller can access the Cassandra
original database in the first horizontal layer (cf. Figure 3),
but it cannot access the de-identified statistics data. Whereas,
analysis services can access the de-identified anonymised
database, but they cannot write data into the original mon-
goDB database.
Definition 6 (DAC Authority). Let CT =
{Ct1, Ct2, · · · , Ctn} be the set of controllers in the
8Access control list syntax; https://www-01.ibm.com/software/network/ di-
rectory/library/publications/ dmt/ref acls.htm
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CONTROLLER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
1. c→ AS - Sends controller’s ID, Crc.IDc, to KC.
2. AS
2.1. - Use Crc.IDc to check if c is listed in
KC’s database.
2.2. - Create a time stamp TSc and a session key
SKTGS for the ticket.
2.3. - Generate Tc = EncPKTGS (IDc, TSc, SKTGS ).
2.4. - Retrieve Crc.pc from KC’s database.
2.5. - Generate controller’s secret key
Kc = hash(Crc.pc).
2.6. - Create MA = EncKc (SKTGS ),
MB = Tc.
3. AS → c MA, MB .
4. c
4.1. - Generate a secret key Kc = hash(Crc.pc)
from c’s password.
4.2. - Decrypt MA by Kc to obtain SKTGS .
4.3. - Create MC = [MB , IDDBS , ReqDBS ]
and MD = EncSKTGS (IDc, TSc).
5. c→ TGS - Sends MC ,MD .
6. TGS
6.1. - Decrypt MB in MC by PKTGS to obtain
SKTGS and IDc.
6.2. - Decrypt MD by SKTGS to get IDc.
6.3. - Compare IDc retrieved in step 6.1. and IDc
retrieved in step 6.2. If the result is ”equal”,
c is authenticated to TGS.
system. Let CL = {Cl1, Cl2, · · · , Cln} be the set of user
collections in the system. Let P = {R,W} be the set
permissions in the system. The set of permissions granted for
each controller is defined as a 2-dimension array DAC.
DAC = {DAC(Ct1,Cl1), DAC(Ct1,Cl2), DAC(Ct1,Cl3) · · · }
where
DAC(Ct1,Cl1) = (Ct1, Cl1, P(Ct1,Cl1))
DAC(Ct1,Cl2) = (Ct1, Cl2, P(Ct1,Cl2))
· · ·
Example 4. According to Figure 2, we have
Ct = {portal,mobile, analysis backend, · · · },
Cl = {clinic, school, children, · · · }, P =
{R,W}. A DAC authority is DAC =
{{portal, clinic, {R,W}}, {portal, school, {R,W}}, · · · }.
We use LDAP protocol for communication between the
authorisation process and the active directory (AD) which
stores an access control list (ACL) of permissions for each
controller. The DAC table (c.f. Definition 6) is stored in the
AD. Each controller’s permissions are defined in an ACL
entry. Whereas, the Kerberos protocol authorises requests from
the controller. The LDAP active directory can be stored in
a separated LDAP server or in the same Kerberos server.
The authorisation process is executed after the controller
authentication was successful.
The authorisation protocol must follow the authentication
process (see VI-A). The authorisation protocol is described in
steps 4, 5, 6 of Figure 6 and presented in Table II. Once TGS
compares the two identities of the controller c, TGS searches
in its AD for an entry that defines access permissions for c to
the database service DBS. Then TGS compares the access
permissions in DAC(c,DBS) and the request ReqDBS . If they
are not equal, TGS sends a reject message to c. Otherwise,
TGS issues two new messages: ME and MF (steps 1.1, 1.2)
where ME is the issued ticket used by C with the service
DBS. ME = EncPKDBS (IDc, TSc−DBS , SKDBS ) is an
encryption made by the secrete key of service (i.e., PKDBS),
of controller ID (i.e. IDc), time stamp (i.e. TSc−DBS),
and the shared key of the service (i.e., SKDBS ); whereas,
MF = EncSKTGS (SKDBS ) is an encryption of the shared
key of the service (i.e., SKDBS ) made by TGS’s shared key
SKDBS . Then, TGS sends ME and MF to the controller c
(step 2). The controller c decrypts MF with TGS’s shared
key SKTGS to obtain the shared key of service DBS (i.e.,
SKDBS ), the time stamp of controller c and service s (i.e.,
TSc−DBS), and the identity of controller c (i.e, IDc) (step
3.1). Then, c creates a new message MG, that is an encryption
of the controller’s identity (i.e., IDc) and the time stamp of
controller c and service DBS (i.e., TSc−DBS) (step 3.2).
After that, controller c sends ME and MG to the database
service DBS (step 4). When DBS receives the two messages
from c, it first decrypts ME using the secrete key of s
(i.e., PKDBS ) to obtain the shared key of DBS and the
controller’s identity IDc (step 5.1). DBS decrypts MG using
the shared key SKDBS to obtain the controller’s identity (i.e.,
IDc) (step 5.2). Then, DBS compares the two messages ME
and MG (step 5.3), if the comparison results in ”equal” (i.e.,
ME = MG), c is authorised and can access the data service
DBS. Simultaneously, DBS creates a message MH that is
an encryption of the time stamp TSc−DBS granted to be used
between c and DBS. After that, DBS sends MH to c (step 6).
After receiving MH , c decrypts MH using service’s shared key
(i.e., SKDBS ) to obtain TSc−DBS (step 7.1). c compares the
two time stamp in the two messages retrieved from decrypting
MF (step 3.1) and MH (step 7.1). Finally, c sequentially sends
its requests to DBS.
VII. SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION
When a subject, such as a user or a controller, attempts to
access data at the back-end, it has to go through two substantial
security shields, that is, authentication process (cf. Section V)
and authorisation process (cf. Section VI). Even though such
a data access is rigorous, the risk of data leakage is still likely
to occur, especially when storing and transmitting the data.
Moreover, in our system, the data storage is distributed. the
databases are located on different servers (cf. Section IV). Any
request to access the data the database servers collaborate to
output a response.
To protect data storage against attacks, the storage system
uses encryption algorithms. MongoDB supports various en-
cryption schemas9, such a default with AES-256 in CBC and
GCM mode.10 The encryption schema can be configured to
comply with FIPS 140-2.11 Cassandra supports Transparent
9Securing MongoDB Part 3: Database Auditing and Encryption
https://www.mongodb.com/blog/post/securing-mongodb-part-3-database-
auditing-and-encryption
10Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), NIST, FIPS 197,
2001
11Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, NIST, FIPS 142, 2001
9TABLE II
CONTROLLER AUTHORISATION PROTOCOL
1. TGS
1.1. Search in AD for c’s entry DAC(c,DBS) .
1.2. Compare access permissions in DAC(c,DBS) and
reqDBS in MC .
1.3. If equal, do step 1.3. Otherwise, sends a rejection
response to c.
1.4. Create
ME = EncPKs (IDc, TSc−DBS , SKDBS ).
1.5. Create MF = EncSKTGS (SKDBS ).
2. TGS → c - Sends ME ,MF .
3. c
3.1. Decrypt MF by SKTGS to obtain SKDBS ,
TSc−DBS , and IDc.
3.2. Create MG = EncSKDBS (IDc, TSc−DBS).
4. c→ DBS - Sends ME ,MG.
5. DBS
5.1. Decrypt ME by PKDBS to obtain SKDBS
and IDc.
5.2. Decrypt MG by SKDBS to obtain IDc.
5.3. Compare ME and MG. If ME =MG, has c
authorised, and creates
MH = EncSKDBS
(TSc−DBS).
6. DBS → c - Sends MH .
7. c
7.1. Decrypt MH by SKDBS to obtain TSc−DBS .
7.2. Compare TSc−DBS from steps 3.1 and 7.1.
If ” = ”, DBS is authorised.
Data Encryption (TDE)12 for a lightweight encryption of data
and log files that are stored in the master database of server
that contains administrative data used for monitoring and
controlling the system.
Data transmission also needs to be protected against eaves-
droppers. Usually the stored data are queried and transmitted
in a plain form that can be read in-flight by the third party. We
adopted Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/ Transport Layer Security
(TLS) [23] for securing the data transmitted over the network.
This protocol is applied between any two components of the
system. For example, as in Figure 3, the two parties needing
a secure data transmission between themselves included Orig-
inal MongoDB Database and the module De-identification,
since data from Original MongoDB Database is transferred
to the module De-identification.
The goal of this protocol is to secure the data while it
is exchanged between two nodes. A secure protocol using
SSL/TLS is presented in details in Table III between c and s.
It is assumed that c and s have their own pair of asymmetric
keys including a public key and a private key. We assume
that all transactions made between c and s are secured by
the session key, SKc−s. Basically, SSL/TLS connection is
established based on the handshake between the two sides
c and s. It is assumed that each side has its own pair of
public key and private key. Whenever one side, e.g. c, has
an SSL/TLS connection request, c sends to s a connection
request, its supported SSL/TLS protocol version (e.g., TLS
1.2), and a list of cipher suits that it supports (step 1). Cipher
suit is a set of cryptographic algorithms that c supports,
such as symmetric (AES-256 CBC/GCM, etc.) or asymmetric
12Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption Best Prac-
tices, https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/security/twp-transparent-
data-encryption-bes-130696.pdf
TABLE III
SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
1. c→ s Send
1.1. - SSL session request.
1.2. - Supported protocol version, list of cipher suits CS.
2. s
2.1. Create the request accepted.
2.2. Check supported protocol version.
2.3. Select cipher algorithms from CS.
3. s→ c Send
3.1. - Selected cipher algorithm list.
3.2. - SSL certificate of the public key Ks.
3.3. - s’s public key Ks.
4. c
4.1. - Create session key SKc−s.
4.2. - Encrypt SKc−s with Ks.
5. c→ s Send EncPs (SKc−s).
6. s Decrypt EncPs (SKc−s) by private key PKs to get
SKc−s.
algorithms (e.g., RSA), hash function (e.g., SHA, DES) and
key exchange protocols (e.g. DHE), etc. An example of cipher
suit: ”ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256”. Once s accepts
a connection request, it creates an acceptance notification (step
2.1). Then s checks if it also supports the c’s protocol version
(step 2.2). If this is the case, s matches the cipher suits
in the list received from c with its supported cryptographic
algorithms, and selects the suitable ones (step 2.3). s sends to
c the list of selected cryptographic algorithms (step 3.1), an
SSL certificate (step 3.2), and its public key (i.e., Ks) (step
3.3). After receiving certificate and Ks from s, c creates a
session key, SKc−s used for all communications between c
and s (step 4.1). c encrypts the session key with the public
key Ks to output EncPs(SKc−s) (step 4.2). Then, c sends
the encryption EncPs(SKc−s) to s (step 5). s uses its private
key PKs to obtain the session key SKc−s (step 6). Then, the
session key is used for all transactions between c and s. This
protocol is applied for all transactions between any of two
modules or two nodes in the system.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed model through
the immune ability against attacks, that is, replay attack,
eavesdropping attack and unauthorised spy.
a) Replay attack: Usually the adversary tries to get
packets transmitted through the network, and reuses them later
in the following sessions for the purpose of impersonating
the sending nodes. If the attack is successful, the adversary
receives the response. In case the response may contain
sensitive information, the adversary can take advantage of the
information for, which affects very badly the users privacy and
sensitive data leakage.
Lemma 5. In the proposed model, the adversaries cannot
reuse the released packet for the replay attack purpose.
Proof. In our model, each packet is stamped with a validation
time. Based on this time, the receiving nodes in the network
check the packet’s expiration, by comparing its time stamp
with the current time to see if the time interval is greater
than the requested time threshold. If this is a case, the packet
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is dropped. The problem is that how long is enough for a
packet’s time to live so that the system can prevent the replay
attack in time.
b) Eavesdropping attack: The eavesdropper tries to stalk
packets found in the network for the further purposes. They
may be benign or malicious. If they are just honest-but-curious
adversaries, they read the sensitive information in the delivered
packet only to satisfy their curiosity. However, this type of
attack can leave the backdoor in the system. Then, the more
malicious adversary may be, successfully do their attack will
be. With malicious adversaries, they are more harassed and
dangerous. They aim to get more personal information to
get more benefits, and may seriously harm user’s honour,
privacy and finance, or to interfere with the data to change
data integrity.
Lemma 6. in the proposed model, Eavesdroppers cannot
modify the package content or get any sensitive information
from the communication tunnel.
Proof. Hence, in our proposed model, we protect user data
as they are transferred through the network by adopting the
SSL/TLS protocol. This protocol creates a robust tunnel to
hide all transmitted data especially encrypting them right when
they are released from the application and at the transport
layers. Moreover, with SSL/TLS protocol, a cipher suit ex-
ploits different encryption algorithms and hash functions. So,
eavesdroppers cannot get any sensitive information from the
tunnel.
c) Unauthorised spy: Our model can protect data against
unauthorised spies by authenticating and authorising the users
and the controllers attempting to access data at the back-end.
Spies can abuse the lack of security check, such as authenti-
cation and authorisation, to steal important information. After
retrieving the crucial information, they turn into the previous
eavesdropping adversaries, and get either benign or malicious.
Lemma 7. In the proposed model, the user and controller
cannot access database and use the data with any purpose.
Proof. In the proposed model, the granted permissions of a
user and controller must be stored in the active directory
centre to be able to access database. When a user or controller
sends a data access request, the server will check for suitable
permission in the active directory. If this is a case, the server
passes the request to the back-end database server.
IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This research is a part of a larger project which focuses
on monitoring the changes of obesity-related behavioural risk
factors (what and how children eat, how they move, how
they sleep) to the prevalence of obesity, and to define a
parsimonious behavioural model and data structure that will be
free of redundant individual information and will minimise the
use of sensitive information. The users of our system include
the clinicians, school teachers, and public health authorities.
To achieve such objectives, first we build a software system
that collects, stores and analyses the data sets of children
and adolescent from different locations around Europe. The
children and patients join the system on voluntarily basis.
The system collects their behaviours and relevant infor-
mation (e.g., daily exercises, food consumption, junk food
quantity, locations, clinics, schools, groups, etc.), and stores
them in the two major databases: MongoDB and Cassandra.
MongoDB is the core database where the most of data is
stored. Cassandra is used for collecting the time-series data
from users’ smart devices which are processed then stored
in the local storage of the smart devices before they are
transferred to MongoDB (c.f. Section IX-A).
To provide clinicians and developers a tool to access the
above two databases, we implement a set of interfaces: Clinical
Advisor (CA) services. A description of these services are
presented in Appendix A. Each service gives an output data
through a graph which the clinicians can use for comparing
situations of individual children or groups of children, to
monitor the children patients, to recommend the effective
treatments or needed therapies suitable to each patient.
Each user in the system must be granted permissions.
User permissions are discussed in Section V. Moreover, these
services can be accessed by other components in the system,
such as controllers or modules (c.f. Section VI).
A. Database Schema
In order to provide a full pack of Clinical Advisor services,
we design and implement a database in term of 28 collections
in MongoDB (c.f. Figure 7), such as regions, groups, children,
students, etc., and 8 tables in Cassandra database (c.f. Figure
9), such as devices, sessions by user, physical activities by
user, physical activities by date, etc.
B. Deployment Environment
In the proposed software system, there are two main mod-
ules, that is, Application module and Analysis module. Each
module includes a front-end server and a cluster of nodes.
The Application module is responsible for data storage in
Cassandra and MongoDB, receives the requests, and provides
services for Mobile App Controller, Web App Controller, and
Portals Controller. This module hosts an Apache Balancer
and a Tomcat Server. TLS/SSL and Kerberos are set up
in this server. Whereas, the Analysis module provides the
computations for analysis services. This module also provides
the interfaces for Back-end Analysis and Services. Currently,
they are all deployed on the same server. For our implemen-
tation and testing, the system uses Apache Server 2.4, Tomcat
8, Cassandra > 3.1, MongoDB 3.4 (Community version),
Java, Python, JSON, Flask, Apache Maven13, JUnit14, and
SonarQube15. The Tomcat server contains the REST APIs as
interfaces of the system for controllers and end-users. They
contain different APIs depending on the required functionality.
The Keberos and LDAP servers are always connected to the
Tomcat server to get the requests from users and controllers,
then process the request and reply back to the Tomcat server.
13https://maven.apache.org/
14https://junit.org/junit5/
15https://www.sonarqube.org/
11
Fig. 7. MongoDB schema of our system
Fig. 8. Code Quality Test
C. System Quality Test
We test the Clinical Advisor services after they were inte-
grated into the main system. We run various types of tests. For
code quality testing, we use the software SonarQube, and for
code testing we use the tool JUnit. SonarQube measures the
following criteria to ensure that the system has high quality
code; no bugs, no vulnerabilities, no technical debts, no code
duplication, and no duplicated blocks.
Figure 8 presents the testing results of the whole system
after executing the unit testing and the code quality testing.
The code smells are pieces of code that, while technically not
wrong, should be altered. As all the returned measurements
are rated A that means the code is of high quality.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper, we show that designing and implementing a
system for large and sensitive data-driven application is not
straightforward, mainly the storage system, where the data
should be stored and preserved from any unauthorised access.
Moreover, this is not enough, as the data needs to be accessed
for analysis purposes. This creates another challenge, as it has
to be protected during its transit over the network. We can
argue that these are provided by the operating system of both
clients and hosts machines. However, we showed in this paper
that this is not enough. Sensitive data should and must be
protected independently of the underlying operating system or
the system security put in place either at client or host.
The proposed architecture not only incorporates security and
protection by design but also provides a framework for any
system architecture that deals with data-driven applications.
Our architecture separates between access permissions to
original data, and its derived data for special use (statistics
and analysis for instance). We also provide a set of services
for the external users to access the back-end. We provide a
formal model to prove the system resilience to attacks and
implemented it using popular and tools.
As a future work, one needs to provide an automated
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Fig. 9. Cassandra Database Schema
security-aware system for data analysis. We will to generalise
the proposed architecture to any system where the data is the
main focus. We will also improve the anonymised data in the
architecture (see Figure 3), to provide a set of secure interfaces
for external users to do data mining on the anonymous data.
APPENDIX A
CLINICAL ADVISOR (CA) GRAPHS
We implemented the graphs to support clinicians in observ-
ing and helping the patients. The Clinical Advisor module
of the system provides basic statistics via two RESTful web
services interface, Individual and Population.
A. Individual Services
An indicator is measurable quantity to provide the informa-
tion about an individuals behaviour in eating, physical activity
and sleep. This service provides statistical graphs of the user.
Given a time period and an indicator, these graphs show how
the indicator changes during that period.
1) Numeric Indicators: There are three types of graphs for
Individual services for supporting clinicians. The changes are
displayed by average values.
Fig. 10. A graph of activity counts in Clinical Portal.
• Daily MET. This graph shows the average MET
(Metabolic equivalent of task), which expresses the en-
ergy cost in physical activities during a period of time.
Higher MET corresponds to heavier activities. This graph
supports clinicians in checking the effectiveness of phys-
ical activities.
• Daily physical activity counts. This graph shows the aver-
age activity counts during a given time period (Figure 10).
Higher counts correspond to higher physical activities.
This will support clinicians in observing the effectiveness
of physical activities.
• Daily physical activity steps. This graph shows the av-
erage activity steps during a time period. This graph
provides clinicians a tool of monitoring the most popular
types of physical activities (walking, running, etc.).
2) Categorical Indicators: Categorical indicators allow to
provide graphs for meal types, visited locations, and trans-
portation modes. Changes are expressed by the distribution of
values.
• Daily dietary. This graph shows the distribution of meals
at different times during the day. With this graph, clin-
icians can get information about the dietary habits of
children (c.f. Figure 11).
Fig. 11. A graph of daily meals of a child in Clinical Portal
• Daily visited locations. This graph shows the location
types a child usually visits. With this graph, clinicians can
learn more about favourite locations of children and their
habits. For example, if children prefer sedentary activities
or dynamic activities, how often children join community
activities or use recreational facilities.
• Daily transportation. This graph presents commuting
travels and frequent travelling methods. Clinicians know
their travel habits.
B. Population Services
A population can be patients of a clinic, students of a
school. The population graphs provide the statistical data of a
population. These graphs contain the body measurement distri-
butions (height, weight, BMI class) that are typical indicators
to consider to measure children body fat. Using these graphs,
clinicians can know the prevalence of obesity in a community
or population.
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Fig. 12. A graph of daily meals of a group in Clinical Portal
C. Mock-up Services
As a future works, we will implement more graphs to
support clinicians. The planned graphs are listed below:
• Graphs for food consumption and body measurements
shows the relationship between food consumption and
body measurements (e.g., weight, BMI) over a time
period.
• Graphs for physical activities and body measurements
shows the relationship between physical activities and
body measurements (e.g., weight, BMI) over a time
period.
• Graphs for food environment and body measurements
shows the relationship between food environment and
body measurements (e.g., weight, BMI) over a time
period.
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